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Robert C. Berring has called West Publishing Company’s American Digest System
“the key aspect of the new form of legal literature” that West and other publishers
developed in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Berring argued that West’s
digests provided practicing lawyers not only the means for locating precedential
cases, but a “paradigm for thinking about the law itself” that influenced American
lawyers until the development of online legal research systems in the 1970s. This
article discusses questions raised by Berring’s scholarship, and examines the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century legal environment in which the West digests
were created and became essential research tools for American lawyers.

I.

Introduction
[W]hile a digest is a device of somewhat higher order than an index, it is after all only a laborsaving device. It is a mere tool for digging the precious metals from the mines of judicial
reports, and is in no sense a medium for the inculcation of legal principles, and logical
methods in the application thereof.
Benjamin Tradwell, Suggestions for a Practical Digest, 3 Am. Law. 337, 337 (1895).

Sometimes we are least aware of that which most affects us. So it seems with respect to legal
categories. …They inhibit our imagination of what is acceptable, indeed, of what is possible.
They take on a quality of givenness and thereby disempower us.
Gregory S. Alexander, The Transformation of Trusts as a Legal Category, 1800–1914, 5 Law & Hist.
Rev. 303, 303 (1987).

Steven Lastres’s 2013 paper, “Rebooting Legal Research in a Digital Age”1 could be a wakeup call for academic law librarians involved in legal research instruction. Reporting the results of
a LexisNexis-funded survey, the paper covers the amount of research newer associates in large
and small law firms are required to perform, the extent to which they rely on electronic sources,
and how little training they receive from their employers. At a time when law schools are placing
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renewed emphasis on graduating students with practice-ready skills, the paper provides arguments
for including legal research training in those efforts, and is worth distributing to law students
skeptical of the value of legal research courses.
Lastres reports briefly on the research processes of the newer associates.2 The survey results
show heavy reliance on online research sources, which aligns with the data reported annually in
the American Bar Association Legal Technology Resource Center’s survey of legal research
practices.3 The paper includes a section under the heading: “A legal classification is rarely
followed,” discussing how infrequently newer lawyers use classification systems. A short
discussion suggests both that very few begin case law research by consulting a legal classification
system and that “a third of respondents admit typically not accessing a legal classification system
at all when conducting case law research.”4
This result seems neither very surprising nor perhaps worthy of the space it occupies in a short
paper.5 Its prominence may be understandable, however, in light of the continuing impact of the
scholarship of Bob Berring and others regarding the influences of West Publishing Company’s
digest system on legal research and American law itself. 6
In the first of a series of articles published mostly between 1986 and 2000, Berring called the
digests “the key aspect of the new form of legal literature” that West developed in the last quarter
of the nineteenth century.7 Not only did the West digests provide the means for locating
precedential cases, a practicing lawyer’s primary concern, but they also created “a paradigm for
thinking about the law itself.”8 Once exposed to West’s Key Number System, “[l]awyers began to
think according to the West categories.”9 For Berring, by creating a classification system with a
location “for every possible legal issue . . . [West’s] subject arrangement lent its structure to
American law.”10
Berring was not the first to consider the possible influences of the digest and other forms of
legal publication on lawyers’ thinking. In the 1923 first edition of his classic textbook on legal
research, Frederick C. Hicks anticipated Berring in the statement that: “With the multiplicity of
2
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decided cases the whole fabric of the common law would long ago have broken down were it not
for the digest.”11 Hicks acknowledged the troubling pace at which the amount of published law
was growing, yet he wrote during a period of relative stability in the forms and formats of published
legal information. The material was still all in one format—print—and accessible in law libraries
through the digests, bulky and cumbersome as they might be.
Berring, on the other hand, wrote at a time of great ferment and change in the ways that legal
information was published, accessed, and used. Since the mid-1970s, Lexis and Westlaw, the two
primary American legal databases, had vastly expanded their offerings of both legal and non-legal
sources. Each service also offered search capabilities that allowed and encouraged lawyers to
construct searches outside the structures of pre-coordinated indexes and digest topics.12 By the
turn of the century, the Internet would emerge as an important alternative for research in law.
Berring wondered what impacts comprehensive full-text electronic research systems providing
both the texts of the law and new means to find them would have on lawyers accustomed to relying
on legal materials in print and print tools like digests? What might be lost as free-text electronic
tools replaced indexed tools in print formats?
This article begins in Section II with a history of the early development of the West digests,
followed by in section III by a review of Berring’s ideas about the influences of the West digests
on how American lawyers think about the law. Section IV discusses the questions raised by
Berring’s scholarship, and how his work challenges later writers to consider more precisely how
the forms of legal information might influence lawyers’ thinking. Section V then examines the
historical context in which the West digests were created and first became essential research tools
for American lawyers. This section looks at three aspects of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century legal environment to see how lawyers of that period might have used digests and
classification systems in that period in ways that that influenced their thinking about the law: (1)
concerns within the legal profession about increasing numbers of so-called “case lawyers;” (2) the
profession’s general interests in the benefits of projects to classify the law; and (3) how West’s
own publications presented and characterized the digests during the latter part of the period.
Section VI offers final thoughts on the possible influences of the West digest.
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II.

A Brief History of the West Reporter System and Digests
A. Rapidly Expanding Case Law and the West Reporters

Common law lawyers have complained about the burdens of having to search through too
many court decisions to locate precedential cases and worried over the impacts of the masses of
cases on the common law system since long before the West digests appeared in the last quarter
of the nineteenth century. As Allan Hanson put it, “The threat [of cases overwhelming the system]
has recurred with almost monotonous regularity throughout the history of the common law.” 13
Until the mid-nineteenth century, however, the volume of American reports remained small
enough that many practitioners could still read and retain what was necessary for them to practice,
14
while continuing to complain about the growing numbers of law books. During the period of
post-Civil War industrialization and geographic expansion, the number of decided cases in state
and federal courts increased dramatically. Soon, the established systems for publishing decisions,
based largely on official reporters appointed in each state, were no longer adequate for individual
jurisdictions or on a national basis. Along with other entrepreneurial publishers, the West
Publishing Company entered the growing market for published reports and succeeded in meeting
lawyers’ demands for better reporting and access by developing standardized products notable for
their accuracy, comprehensiveness, and timeliness.15
Morris Cohen viewed West’s publications as part of “a series of bibliographic innovations
which were to shape legal research for at least the next hundred years [and] enabled the bench and
bar to retain orderly access to a legal literature which was growing so fast as to render research
difficult and time-consuming.” 16 From modest beginnings in 1876 as a publisher of excerpted
Minnesota court decisions in newspaper format,17 West soon became the major contributor to the
13
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increased volume of published American case law through its series of unofficial reporters of court
decisions, the National Reporter System. Some of West’s competitors attempted to follow the
English practice of selective publication of court opinions, but West’s comprehensive case
reporting system prevailed in the marketplace and contributed to a “gigantic growth in published
cases” during the last quarter of the nineteenth century.18 Grant Gilmore wrote in The Ages of
American Law:
After ten or fifteen years of life with the National Reporter System, the American legal
profession found itself in a situation of unprecedented difficulty. There were simply too
many cases, and each year added its frightening harvest to the appalling glut. A precedentbased, largely non-statutory system could not long continue to operate under such
pressures.19
B. The Development of the West Digest
In 1887, West began annual publication of the American Digest, a comprehensive national
scheme designed to facilitate access to the rapidly growing body of reports. If West’s system for
reporting opinions had exacerbated the problem of too many cases, the company’s digests were
intended to provide a solution for lawyers struggling to locate precedents. The American Digest
was not the first comprehensive digest of American court opinions;20 but was established as a
continuation to the U.S. Digest, which included both retrospective coverage of cases “from earliest
days to 1870” and annual volumes for cases decided after 1871.21 After purchasing the U.S. Digest
Thomas A. Woxland, “Forever Associated with the Practice of Law”: The Early Years of West Publishing
Company, Legal Reference Services Q., Spring 1985 at 115.
18
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and another competing publication, the Complete Digest, 22 in 1897 West began publishing the
Century Edition of the American Digest, billed in its subtitle as “A Complete Digest of all Reported
American Cases from the Earliest Times to 1896.”23 The 50 volume set was completed in 1904,
after which West continued to issue annual volumes of the American Digest, then decennial
cumulations. The First Decennial Digest, covering cases from 1897–1906, incorporated the West
key number classification system,24 which provided the framework for organizing and finding the
cases indexed in the company’s later digests. Eventually West published digests corresponding to
its regional reporters of state decisions, as well as digests for individual states, the federal courts,
and the U.S. Supreme Court.
West’s first annual American Digest volumes did not include indexes to either the classification
system or the cases it digested. Starting in 1887, the annual cumulations were organized
alphabetically by topic with an alphabetical table of contents indicating the numbers of digest
paragraphs listed under each main head. Starting in 1890, the tables of contents included a note
pointing out that, in addition the main heads, the Digest included “thousands of SPECIFIC crossreferences, carrying the researcher DIRECTLY TO THE PARAGRAPHS for which he is
seeking.”25
In 1897, West issued the first of the 50 volumes that would make up the Century Edition of the
American Digest, completing the set in 1904.26 The spine of each volume of the Century Edition
notes the range of topics or titles included in that volume: the spine of volume 26, for example,
indicates that it includes titles from Homicide through Imprisonment. The volume also includes
an alphabetical list of the titles it includes.27 Two of those titles: Homicide, and Husband and Wife
are main heads; the others are cross-reference heads which refer the researcher to main heads
throughout the set. The main heads have scope notes and are analyzed with detailed outlines
leading to section numbers with references to cases and summaries. The scope note for Homicide
defines what is covered and provides the titles of main heads for related topics that it doesn’t cover:
Suicide, Conspiracy, Bail, and Death.28 There is also a list of cross-references to other topics. The
individual volumes of the Century Edition do not include an outline of the full classification system
or an alphabetical list of all main heads.29 Volume 50 includes a comprehensive index of the main
heads and cross-reference heads for the entire set with references to specific sections of main
heads.30
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The researcher could therefore enter the Century Edition by choosing a volume likely to
include main heads or cross-reference heads for the topic being researched, or (after it was
published in 1904) by consulting the comprehensive index. Either approach would lead to cases
relevant to the research topic, but neither provided much context for what was found. Placed
alphabetically with the other main heads, Homicide reveals little about its relationship to the other
heads classified under the broader topic: Crime. If the researcher were interested in something as
specific as claims of self-defense, the comprehensive index refers directly to sections 138–176
under Homicide, each of which covers a specific aspect of self-defense, such as section 170 (“Duty
to retreat when attack is on one’s own premises”), but it bypasses the scope note and analysis for
Homicide.
In either situation, the researcher could broaden the inquiry and learn more about the law of
homicide or, with a bit more effort, learn how the topic Homicide fit into the overall classification
scheme, but there is no way we can know whether or how often this happened. Would the lawyers
of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century have seen much value in such exercises
after the digest had already taken them directly to cases on point for their research?
In 1904, West included a 450 page index to all fifty volumes in the final volume of the Century
Edition of the American Digest. The index entries were made up of the Century Edition’s “Main
Heads, and Cross-Reference Heads with the references thereunder.”31 In contrast, upon completion
of the first Decennial Digest in 1912, the company published a 2,000 page Descriptive Word Index
to the Decennial. An early advertisement for the new index noted that it included “words and
terms descriptive of the persons, places and things, as well as of the crimes, torts, contracts and
remedies which have been the subject of litigation.”32 The descriptive word indexes thereby
allowed lawyers to search for cases using factual terms and others beyond those that were elements
of the digest classification, and to go directly to specific key numbers listing cases useful to their
research. Although the advertisement described the classification system as “simplicity itself,” it
pointed out that the Descriptive Word Index would aid searchers who asked “[h]ow do I find the
Key-Number for the proposition which I am investigating?” but were “not familiar with [the
system’s] logical and scientific arrangement.”33 How would these lawyers be influenced by the
classification system if they followed an approach that allowed or perhaps encouraged them to
avoid using it to locate cases?
C. Distinguishing Classification Systems and Indexes
In thinking about the possible influences of the West digests on the thinking of individual
lawyers, it is helpful to consider the distinctions between classification systems and indexes. As
explained by Allan Hanson, a classification system “reflects ideas about meaningful relationships
among the parts in the body of information being classified”; an index, on the other hand, is a
finding device and “conveys nothing about relationships that may exist among different topics.”34
Hanson saw West’s system as a “classified index,” which served both the classification and
indexing functions. As a result, “the taxonomic classifications built into print research tools
31
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promote a view of the law as a hierarchically organized system based on general principles.”35
This view applies generally accepted ideas about the influences of categories and classifications
to the digests. It also supports Berring’s arguments regarding the digest’s influences.36
In the nineteenth century, American lawyers had to rely on the “classified indexes” of digest
classification systems to locate cases relevant to the problems they were researching. Although
some pre-West digests included separate alphabetical lists of headings that could take the
researcher directly to a useful topic in the classification system, they were not considered primary
means of entrance into the system. The Abbott brothers’ 1877 digest of New York state cases, for
example, included a comprehensive index to the entire five volume set, but the compilers advised
its users that “[f]or the most part, the book is its own Index. For a clue to the place where any topic
is treated at length, the reader must resort, in the first instance, to the body of the work [and] its
alphabetical arrangement….” The index was to be used for the limited purposes of locating
“kindred points” or “matters that belong to no one title of the law.”37
Until other publishers started to adopt West’s classification system in the late nineteenth
century,38 digests were arranged according to the individual and perhaps idiosyncratic systems of
each editor, creating problems of inconsistency that became more apparent as the amount of case
law continued to grow. In 1896, the ABA Committee on Law Reporting and Digesting, which
was generally favorable to the efforts of commercial law book publishers, criticized the available
digests and indexes for problems of inconsistency and poor arrangement:
Each digester and every reporter seems to have adopted a plan which seemed best and
most convenient to him, without much regard to the views of others engaged in the same
work, and in many cases with but little attention to the convenience of those for whose use
the work is intended.39
In 1898 the ABA Committee’s report again emphasized the importance of consistency and noted
that “[i]t does not matter so much what plan of classification is adopted as that we shall know
clearly what the plan is, and that the same plan is always followed.” The report then pointed out
that the digest’s purpose “is to enable any lawyer to find any point in any decision, and the most
essential feature of all is a full index in addition to this alphabetical order of topics.”40
35
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III.

Berring’s Ideas on the Influence of the West Digest

Berring argued that, because American lawyers relied on West’s digests to locate the
information they needed for their daily work, they came to think about the law through the concepts
embodied in the digest classification system. In 1986, he pointed out that the system “not only
enabled lawyers to research cases by subject, it also allowed and encouraged lawyers to fit every
legal issue into a certain conceptual framework.” 41 “The location of issues and cases in the digests
provided “a substantive context, a setting that told the searcher the meaning of the case as much
as did the opinion itself.”42 In terms of the system’s long-term impacts on American law:
Over the 110 years of the West era, the West System became so embedded in legal thought
that it became invisible. We thought in West terms, we discussed law in West categories.
. . . Without realizing it, we all depended on West for giving us ways to think coherently
about the hundreds of thousands of cases that were stuffed into the reporters.43
Over time, the system “became staggeringly complex and soon was understandable only to its
makers,”44 but “[t]he beautiful part was that they did not have to fully understand how it worked .
. . . The categories established by the Digest system were deeply ingrained.”45 As a result,
“Generations of lawyers learned to conceptualize legal problems using the categories of the Topics
and Key Numbers of the American Digest System.”46 Although only a few “ever truly mastered

In 1901, the Harvard Law Review published a short review of recent advance sheets of Lawyers’ Co-op’s
General Digest and West’s American Digest, finding them to fail in “furnishing an index of current case law.”
Book Review, General Digest, American and English, BiMonthly Advance Sheets (June 1901); American Digest,
Advance Sheets (June 1901), 15 Harv. L. Rev. 245, 245 (1901). The reviewer’s harshest criticisms regarded the
digests’ arrangement:
Nor is the arrangement of these works well adapted to an index. In an orderly statement of legal principles
the number of main divisions is comparatively few. An index of this kind, however, aiming not to state
principles but to afford access to scattered cases and discussions, for its different purpose requires a different
arrangement. One consults it to find material in the volumes indexed bearing upon-some particular point.
He thinks of that point by its special name, and not by the name of that large division of the law under which
it may belong in a scientific classification.
Id. at 245–46.
41
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Thinkable Thoughts, supra note 36 at 311. See also Hanson, supra note 13 at 570 (noting that “[t]he basic firstyear law school curriculum … was designed according to the same basic categories of law that informed the West
digest.”).
At about the same, Gregory Alexander expressed similar ideas regarding the general power of categorical
systems: “By ‘making sense’ of the vast content of the legal system, they direct our attention and shape our
perception of legal norms. ... The order that they impose on legal concepts reflects what we can loosely call a
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supra note 36 at 314.
44
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45
Id. at 1694.
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Id. at 1693.
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the Digest System… [t]he average practitioner learned how to work with parts of the system. She
discovered how to use the available Key Number tags in a rudimentary way, and it was fine.”47
Berring’s thoughts about the influences of the digest system on the thinking of American
lawyers were echoed in the work of other writers exploring how free-text online systems such as
Lexis and Westlaw would impact lawyers’ research practices. Together with works by
contemporaries Ethan Katsh, Dan Dabney, Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Steve Barkan,
and others, Berring’s writings form a core body of literature that must be considered by anyone
hoping to write seriously about the history and role of legal information in the United States.48
His ideas have also continued to resonate in the works of many later writers, some of whom
have described the extent of the digest’s influences in categorical terms.49 In 1993, the first
Research Agenda of the American Association of Law Libraries included a topic which assumed
that print digests had been influential in the development of American law: “What will be the
47
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Future of Legal Research Instruction, Legal Reference Services Q. 263, 265(2009)(“Because law students and
practitioners used the West key number digests to parse and understand legal precedent, the West organizational
structure shaped their general thinking about law itself [and] helped shape the law by virtue of being the
conceptual framework by which lawyers and judges thought about issues.”).
See also Patti Ogden, Mastering the Lawless Science of Our Law: A Story of Legal Citation Indexes, 85 Law
Libr. J. 1, 44 (1993) (“The creaky West Digest system … is grounded in the notion that there is an underlying
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(“Berring argues that the impact of databases like LexisNexis and Westlaw is much deeper in that it involves a
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effects of increased reliance on electronic research on the development of the law, once researchers
are no longer tied to the structures of the digest and other indexing systems?”50

The Challenges of Berring’s Ideas

IV.

A. The Influences of Electronic Research Tools
Berring’s thesis regarding the influences of the digest and other forms of legal publication on
the law and American lawyers is appealing and well-grounded in his extensive knowledge of
nineteenth and early twentieth century legal history. But did he prove his thesis? In 2004 Jim
Milles wrote that “Berring has exhaustively demonstrated the influence of print-based
classification schemes, particularly the West digest system … on American law….”51 Yet,
Berring wrote little about how practicing lawyers used West digests, or how those uses served to
influence their thinking. How does one show what influences research tools might have on
lawyers’ thinking about the law at any time, either at the start of the West era or during the late
twentieth century when print digests began to be bypassed in favor of electronic tools?
Some contemporary commentators questioned whether print research tools could have had the
degree of influence Berring and others suggested. In 1994, Nazareth Pantaloni observed the
growing consensus about the importance of legal research tools in the development of the law and
warned against attributing too much power to the roles of indexes and digests in molding the law.52
After examining how indexes are used in other disciplines, Pantaloni concluded that “perceptions
of the influence of indexes on the law suffers [sic] from the same notion of technological
determinism that plagues the writing about legal databases. While legal indexes may have
influenced the conceptual coherence of the law, they are as much a product as a progenitor of that
conceptual structure.”53
Responding to concerns about the impacts of free text electronic searching, Pantaloni cautioned
that “[t]o suggest that the absence of indexes will undermine the structural coherence of the law
ascribes too much significance to indexes and fails to recognize other normalizing practices in the
law.”54
In 2002, Richard Ross expressed similar cautions regarding claims about the impacts of print
on past development of the law and predictions about the possible effects of electronic media on
its future. 55 Although Ross did not discuss Berring’s work, his review of other scholarship is
important to discussion of Berring’s ideas. Reviewing works by Ethan Katsh and by K.L. Collins
and David Skover, Ross placed those authors within “a particular theoretical tradition” which
50
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assumed that computers and the Internet will have relatively direct, linear, powerful, and
unmediated effects on legal thought and practice.”56 For Ross, scholars writing in this tradition
tended to isolate “the medium as an independent variable that produces identifiable effects,” and
failed to recognize that “[t]he effects of a medium prove difficult to extricate from the attributes
and processes of the society in which is embedded.”57 A medium’s influences on society are “fully”
a product of how the system is used in the society.58
In 1995, anticipating the possible impacts of hypertext on legal research, Eugene Volokh
suggested that technological change might not change the research process as much as some
anticipated. With hypertext: “You'll end up reading little about some things—the things you know
already or the things that aren't relevant to your problem—and a lot about other topics in which
you're more interested. Your experience will be tailored to your particular problem….” Would
this be a change? Volokh thought not, adding:
[P]eople—especially lawyers doing research—have always read books this way. Lawyers
don't read treatises cover to cover. They find the chapter they need, maybe read some
material at the beginning of the chapter, and then go to the subsection that's relevant to them.
Even when reading cases, they often skip over some issues and go directly to others.59
Volokh did not discuss case law research specifically, but his comments would seem to apply to
lawyers’ use of digests as well as other print resources.
B. How Do Lawyers Use Digests?
No one questions the power of the West classification system for locating cases or its
importance as an indexing and organizing tool, especially for late nineteenth century lawyers faced
with the burgeoning numbers of reported cases issued by growing numbers of American courts.
Yet, it would seem that an argument claiming that the digest also influences lawyers’ thinking
about the law should demonstrate how their use of the digest in conducting research influences
them.
In 1986, Berring succinctly described the now familiar West classification system:
The Digest classified all areas of law into seven broad categories. These categories were
then subdivided into some four hundred and thirty topics. Each topic was then further
subdivided into subsections called “Key Numbers” (a trademarked term). These Key
Numbers allowed the topic to be broken into as many subdivisions as were necessary to
completely cover that area of the law. Eventually, a structure of subject headings was
created which provided for every possible legal issue.60
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In 2000 he wrote that the average practitioner had not mastered the classification system, but knew
how to use parts of it.61 But for the digest to influence a lawyer’s thinking, would not that lawyer
need to be exposed to more of its classification structure than the parts needed to solve an immediate
problem ?
In 1996, Barbara Bintliff explained how the process of using the digest might influence a
researcher: First, “[u]sing a combination of legal terminology and major ‘fact words,’ we located
the key number suggested by the facts of our situation. Then, by sorting through brief descriptions
of the many other cases included under that same point of law, we were able to identify the rule
(or rules) which were applicable to our situation.” To be effective, however, the researcher would
then examine cases classified under related key numbers in order to gain “a better understanding
of the context and nature of the rules.”62 In line with Berring’s thinking, Bintliff wrote: “To use
the digest, you have to think in terms that match its organization; you have to think of rules and
hierarchies. The digest's organization follows the same pattern as our legal reasoning process, and
has almost come to be the physical manifestation of ‘thinking like a lawyer.’”63
For Bintliff, the research process changed with the advent of computer-based legal research
systems, which encouraged researchers to limit their research to the sorts of fact-based inquiries
for which computers are best suited and discouraged them from looking beyond individual cases
to see the context provided in the print digests: “It’s as if we completely forget our traditional legal
reasoning training …. Once we have our list of fact-based case citations, we begin the task of
harmonizing the rules they suggest, in effect devising a framework of facts. We never seem to
consider locating the larger, existing framework of rules.”64
In 1990 Peter Schanck had questioned whether practicing lawyers actually used the digest in
the way Bintliff later described.65 Steve Barkan had cited Berring and others in an article discussing
the applications of Critical Legal Studies to legal research for “solid claims that West helped shape
the nature of American law” and suggested the need to examine more closely the relationships
between legal information resources and the substantive development of the law. 66 In reply,
Schanck argued that Barkan’s (and Berring’s) positions regarding the impacts of digests and other
tools were based on mistaken ideas about how attorneys actually conduct research. 67 Schanck
61
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listed several reasons why “key numbers, headnotes, indexes, and so forth have had little or no
impact on either the content of our law or our understanding of the legal system”:
First, when conducting their research, attorneys tend to use more than one system, and
often use several…. This approach tends to … to expose the researcher to a variety of
nondigest classifications….
Second, I have met a number of lawyers who, for various reasons, claim never to use
digests….
Third, lawyers tend to concentrate more on the facts of their cases than on abstract
doctrines. In so doing, they prefer searching descriptive word indexes over topical analyses,
and they search the indexes as much for factual terms as for legal concepts.68
Fourth, my impression is that key number classifications have minimal influence over
the way lawyers perceive the law, even in instances when they use digests exclusively. They
will tend to scan all or most of the cases under several key numbers and, in the process, pay
little attention to the designations assigned to the categories. They then organize the
precedents according to the particularities of their own cases and develop arguments based
on those precedents. By this final stage, the West structure is long forgotten and its effects
negligible.69
Schanck admitted that his claims were based largely on his own experiences. He also failed to
consider other scholarship which suggested that lawyers and others might not always be conscious
of the influences of their tools.70 Yet, his alternative view to those of Berring and later Bintliff
regarding how lawyers used digests in practice made it harder to see how digests might influence
lawyers’ thinking. Schanck also underlined the need to better understand how lawyers use those
tools before drawing conclusions about their influences. Barkan himself had pointed out that
“[r]emarkably little…has been written about these subjects,”71 a comment which echoed Morris
Cohen’s broader 1969 statement “that we know a great deal about the materials of legal research,
… but almost nothing about the actual procedures used by lawyers in their search into the law.”72
In fact, much of the published literature on legal research has focused less on efforts to
understand how lawyers conduct research in practice than on collecting the opinions of law
Librarianship, or Are We All Legal Realists Now? 82 Law Libr. J. 23, 30 n.35 (1990) [hereinafter, Barkan,
Response].
68
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librarians, attorneys, and judges about which research skills are most important and whether or not
newer attorneys possess them.73 Although some newer empirical studies indicate that we will know
more about lawyers’ research practices going forward,74 there is nothing comparable for the past.

V.

The Legal Environment of the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century

It is difficult to do more than speculate about how lawyers used print digests and what
influences the digest classification system might have had on their thinking about the law. This is
particularly true for the long-ago period in which the American Digest and the West classification
system were introduced to American lawyers. Yet, placing the question in historical perspective
lends some insight into how lawyers of the time approached case law research. Three aspects of
the late nineteenth century legal environment are particularly instructive: (1) contemporary
concerns regarding the phenomenon known as the “case lawyer”; (2) the bar’s discussions about
the purposes of classification of the law; and (3) what West’s own representatives said about how
to use its digests. An examination of each suggests that the bar was interested mostly in locating
cases specifically on point to support their arguments in the problem at hand.
A. The Cases and The Facts
Some sense of how nineteenth century print-era lawyers approached their research might be
gained by looking briefly at the history of the term “case-lawyer,” which appeared in AngloAmerican legal journals throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth. Occasionally,
73
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it was used to praise individual lawyers or judges and their approaches to practice. The good case
lawyer not only knew the cases, but also how to apply them; he was “capable, first, of cracking
the judicial nut itself, and, then, of using its contents effectively.”75 In 1869, Justice Samuel Miller
advised new law school graduates not to allow “fear of being called a case lawyer” to deter them
“from the fullest investigation of every thing bearing on the case in hand.76
By the time Justice Miller spoke, however, the term was being used more often in
disparagement than as praise. Journal articles published in 1851 pointed out that a “mere case
lawyer” would neither be interested in a book describing the state of the law at an earlier time,77
nor in journals that were “not confined strictly to what the mere plodding case lawyer would
denominate legal Subjects.”78 Another defined “case lawyer” as “a synonym for a narrow-minded,
short-sighted pettifogger,” whose “practice of reasoning from cases instead of from principles …
degrades the profession, and fills the law with absurdities and injustice.”79
Robert Ferguson has suggested that, as the amount of case law began to accumulate in midcentury, American lawyers were forced to shift from reliance on general principles to what
Ferguson called “textbook law,” and to change how they approached their work:
The early lawyer searched for a declaration derived from common usage and consistent
with nature. His successor, the reader of case reports, thought in terms of the specific
commands that society had placed upon itself. Each had a particular approach to the printed
page. The first looked for connections and resemblance; the second, for distinction and
precision.80
For Ferguson, lawyers who began practice in the 1840s and after “began to accept the overriding
complexity of the law as an intellectual norm. … It was enough to find the detail and application
of the law without worrying about comprehensiveness and theoretical compatibilities.”81
After the Civil War, case lawyers were frequently criticized for their dedication to locating
precedents directly on point with their cases without understanding the principles behind the
decisions well enough to apply them to sets of facts not covered by direct precedents. Commenting
later on the decline of the legal profession, John Dos Passos said of the case lawyer:
He knows little of elementary law, but he carries, as a soldier would a knapsack, a memory
filled with sections of codes and adjudicated cases. A legal combat now consists of hurling
provisions of the Code and "pat" precedents at each other. Hence the modern advocate's
nose is always to be found in a digest, “case”-law accumulating so fast that he must have
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indices to search for his precedents. Poor soul! if he cannot find a precedent, he is in a
terrible sweat.82
From West Publishing Company’s perspective, the primary value of comprehensive
publication of judicial opinions and digests was that it enabled lawyers to find all cases on point
to their research. As part of an 1889 American Law Review symposium of law publishers, John
B. West said that when lawyers ask: “What is the law on this point? ... Is it not the function and
calling of the law publisher to supply the lawyers with mechanical aids toward answering the
question in whatever connection it arises.”83 He continued: “I believe it is the principal business
of American law publishers, to enable the legal profession to examine the American case law on
any given subject, as easily, exhaustively, and economically as possible.”84 In 1892 the president
of the ABA, Emlin McClain, stated his agreement, noting that the “practical lawyer” looks
especially “to find the adjudications involving facts similar to those of his case....”85 To locate
those adjudications, “the constant business of the lawyer is to search text-books, digests and
indexes.”86
John West believed that the problems involved in those searches had been minimized by the
National Reporter System and its accompanying digests: “[t]he profession have now the immense
advantage of being able to turn to a single set of reports and digests, and be sure of finding
everything which the courts have said on any given subject up to the last decision just rendered.”87
Prominent lawyers voiced regrets over the changes they saw in the practice of American law
as lawyers tried to deal with the ever-growing numbers of published decisions. Nineteenth century
case lawyers (and “case judges”)88 were seen not only as placing more emphasis on precedent than
principle, but also as being more concerned with the facts of earlier cases than on the law they
expressed. In 1892, McClain noted that:
It is undoubtedly true that the practical lawyer is likely to attach too much importance to
superficial similarity of facts in seeking cases which shall serve his purpose.… But after
all, he does properly seek cases "on all fours" and value them more highly than those
having only three points in common, involving, therefore, an argument as to whether the
fourth is material. Three legs, it is well-known, furnish a less reliable support than four.89
McClain’s point was illustrated in an 1888 review of a new digest which suggested that case
lawyers would be better called “fact lawyers” because of their obsession with finding precedential
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cases with facts similar (or preferably identical) to their own cases. The reviewer found that the
new digest would allow a lawyer to “fish in this ocean of decisions for what the hoosiers call ‘hog
cases,’—cases which decide the same facts as the case in which he is counsel, and in a way
favorable to his client.”90 In 1898, a review of a collection of negligence cases pointed out the
benefits of one feature: a table of cases classified by type of accident that “will delight the purely
case lawyer.” The review elaborated on the hog case example, relating the story of “a country
lawyer in Indiana at an early day,” who represented the plaintiff in an action of replevin for a hog.
His opponent read “a case on all fours with the case at bar.” When he had finished, the plaintiff's
lawyer argued:
“This case is of no authority for the decision of the case before the court. This was a
lawsuit about a cow. The case before the court is a lawsuit about a hog.” Then, turning to
the defendant's lawyer with a sneer, he said: “Bring us a Hog case.” The learned justice
ruled that the point was well taken and gave judgment for the defendant [sic]. The moral
of this is that, to the case lawyer and the case judge it is not enough to satisfy the doctrine
of stare decisis that two cases are “on all fours with each other;” they must both be “hog
cases.” The object of this classified table of cases is to give the strictly case lawyer a “hog
case.”91
Whether accurately reported or not, the hog case stories clearly indicate the importance of factbased research for lawyers of the period. In 1907, New York State Law Librarian Frank B. Gilbert
noted that the lawyer of the time knew the facts of the case and in “this immense maze of reported
judicial determinations he may well think there is a case with facts like his which, if found, will
be conclusive upon the tribunal which he seeks to convince.92
Although many commentators decried the case lawyer, others recognized that, faced with the
ever-increasing number of published cases, attorneys had no choice but to become case lawyers
for fear that their opponents would find unfamiliar precedents that they could not counter. J.J.
Willett told the Alabama Bar Association in 1893 that he had once viewed the lawyer who needed
“a case to fit a case,” to be an “inferior lawyer.” However, experience had taught him that “the
case lawyer is the most successful lawyer we have, and our most successful lawyers are getting to
be nothing more than case lawyers.”93 Arkansas judge U.M. Rose noted in an 1896 talk before the
Virginia State Bar Association that, while “case lawyer” was once a term of reproach,
90
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now we are all either case lawyers, or are not lawyers at all. … Our legal arguments are
for the most part a mere casino-like matching and unmatching of cases, involving little or
no intellectual effort. The law is ceasing to be a question of principles, and is becoming a
mere question of patterns.94
Rose’s remarks would be echoed in Barbara Bintliff’s later comments on the effects of computerbased systems on the research process.95
The case lawyer’s situation was perhaps best captured in an 1916 address by Solicitor General
John W. Davis. Speaking before the Judicial Section of the ABA,96 Davis quoted from a recent
opinion that described the current bar as “an industrious, painstaking, far-reaching army of sleuths
of the type of Sherlock Holmes, hunting some precedent in some case, confidently assured that if
the search be long enough and far enough some apparently parallel case may be found to justify
even the most absurd and ridiculous contention.”97
But Davis justified the lawyers’ need to consider all published cases because of the courts’
reliance on the binding force of judicial precedents: As a result, “the case lawyer … is not wholly
a self-made man…. He is rather the product of an environment and of circumstances which he is
powerless of his own motion to change or greatly modify.”98 Davis summarized the case lawyer’s
dilemma:
Does not the case for the case lawyer come to this: that so long as the law is based upon
precedents, so long as judges multiply them, and so long as printing presses issue them,
just so long will the case lawyer spend his time in their collection, and just so long will he
belabor the courts with the fagots he has thus industriously bound?99
Faced with an increase from fewer than 1,000 volumes of published reports in 1850 to 11,500 by
the time Davis spoke in 1916, how could lawyers not focus their research on finding cases directly
on point to their problems, as efficiently as possible?
Expressions of nineteenth century concerns about the case lawyer suggest that American
lawyers have long concentrated their research on locating cases on point to an immediate problem,
rather than developing knowledge regarding the principles behind the cases.
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B. Classification and the ABA
Discussions about classification and arrangement of law were common among American
lawyers from the last decades of the nineteenth century into the twentieth.100 Gregory Alexander
argues that the interest in classification during this period stemmed from several factors: the sense
that the common law lacked a workable organization, which was more apparent after the
procedural reforms of the mid-nineteenth century; the thought that classification of the law could
be the means for law reform; and the notion that classifications attempted by late century treatises
writers were inadequate.101 Legal academics provided much of the leadership in these
discussions,102 but the organized bar also brought its concerns about the burgeoning number of
published decisions into play.103
At the second meeting of the American Bar Association in 1879, Edward J. Phelps used an
address on the career of John Marshall to point out that: “[p]erplexed as the law has become with
infinite legislation, confused and distracted with a multitude of incongruous and inconsistent
precedents that no man can number, it is a different system now, although still the same in name,
from that which Marshall dealt with.”104 An 1884 address by John Dillon on American Institutions
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and Laws sparked the Association’s nascent interest in the impacts on American lawyers of what
he termed the “multitudinous mass of decisions,”105 by articulating his fear that the growing burden
of too many cases would cause the common law system to “break down under its own everincreasing and insupportable weight,” eliminate the doctrine of precedent from American law and
substitute the continental system, superseding the law reports by codification.106 In 1886, Dillon
delivered a paper requested by the Committee on Judicial Administration on “Law Reports and
Law Reporting,” in which he noted that “[t]here is no reason to doubt that the judicial reports will
continue to increase as rapidly as ever, adding to the bulk and, to some extent, to the uncertainty
of the law, and this will go on and on until the effect becomes at length insupportable.”107
In 1888, the ABA received a letter from Henry T. Terry, a New York lawyer and author, calling
for an authoritative “complete scientific arrangement of the whole body of the law.”108 Terry
argued that a classification project prepared under the authority of the ABA would both have
practical benefits for the practicing bar and provide a frame-work to guide the future development
of the law in a principled manner, while keeping it manageable and knowable.109 For Terry, the
practical end of making the law easier to find could not be accomplished unless “the arrangement
possesses those characteristics which make it what, for lack of a better word, we may call
philosophical.”110 He argued that a scientific arrangement would “[e]specially … be of service in
providing a sufficient, uniform and easily understood arrangement for the digests and indexes upon
which we are more and more compelled to rely in preparing cases.”111 At present, effective use of
available digests was frustrated by each compiler’s “use of his own peculiar scheme of
arrangement,” and the practice of “taking as heads of classification some of the names of
catchwords that have become at all familiar to lawyers and arranging them alphabetically.”112 As
a result, it was “inevitable that, as we now are, a digest must be arranged largely on the ground of
superficial resemblances between the external circumstances of cases or proximate or derivative
rules, rather than ultimate principles, since the ultimate principles themselves are often not clearly
recognized.”113
Terry proposed that the ABA appoint a committee to solicit and consider various plans of
arrangement. Once adopted, the best plan would be published as an institutional work which
“would take its place by the side of such books as Blackstone’s or Kent’s Commentaries, or rather
would largely supersede them.”114
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Terry’s letter and questions regarding “the arrangement of the law” were referred to a new
Special Committee on the Classification of the Law.115 In 1891, the Special Committee reported
on Terry’s proposal116 and the question of whether “an institutional work setting out the whole
private and substantive law in some detail could be prepared under the direction of the
Association.”117
The Special Committee identified two primary purposes for classifying the law: one, to provide
an orderly arrangement that would allow it to be comprehended as a whole; the other, to provide
a convenient cataloging of the principle topics to collect authorities and allow precedents to be
located. Significantly, however, the Committee saw those purposes as “not necessarily
consistent,” and concluded that “it will be found that they are not practically so.”118 The theoretical
divisions of the law found in scientific classifications “are too general for practical use and…the
practical arrangement of topics for encyclopedias, digests and indexs [sic] is too limited for the
purposes of the jurist.”119 As a result, two classifications were needed and the practical
classification consisting of “a well-defined list of topics or heads under which points decided by
the courts may be arranged for convenient reference, is of the more general importance.”120
The Committee thus rejected the connection that Terry had drawn between the scientific and
practical benefits of classifying the law. It devoted the rest of its report to possible divisions for a
theoretical classification of the law, which might be used to develop a more detailed scheme in the
future.121
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In 1894, the ABA created a Special Committee on Law Reporting “to ascertain the condition
of law reporting throughout the Union.”122 The following year, the new special committee initiated
what would be an ongoing Committee interest in how and whether the available commercial
digests helped lawyers confront the growing body of case law. The report stated optimistically
that: “the condition of affairs as to the multiplication of reported decisions, although discouraging,
is very far from desperate [because d]igests ... have made it comparatively easy, considering the
mass of decisions, to make an exhaustive investigation of any question.”123
In 1895, the Special Committee on Law Reporting became a standing committee covering both
reporting and digesting.124 By including digesting within the jurisdiction of the new standing
committee, rather than that of the then-quiescent Special Committee on Classification, the ABA
institutionalized the distinction between scientific or philosophical classification of the law on the
one hand, and the more practical role of digest classifications on the other.125 The discussion
closed with a motion that Austin Abbott, co-compiler with his late brother Benjamin Vaughan
Abbott of the United States Digest, and “the man most competent in the United States for that
purpose” be requested to work with the committee.126
The new Committee on Law Reporting and Digesting offered its next report in 1896.
Although it was now “more than ever impressed with the difficulties arising from the number of
reported cases, and particularly from the evils resulting from the duplication of reports of the same
opinions,” the Committee acknowledged that it had not made satisfactory progress toward their
solution, in part because of Austin Abbott’s death. 127 The report criticized current digests and
indexes for inconsistency and poor arrangement,128 and argued that “a thorough and carefullycompiled digest” was necessary.129 Although the existing digests “tend to uniformity,” a uniform
122
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official index could not be created “through private effort or enterprise,” but would require either
the concerted action of the body of court reporters, perhaps brought together by the ABA, or a
commission created by the federal government.130
In 1898, after revisiting what it had said in 1895 and 1896, the Committee report stated that
published reports “should be summarized and indexed under a common plan and so as to be readily
accessible to all,”131 then discussed whether commercial publishers were meeting this need. No
individual publishers were named, but West Publishing Company was clearly referenced as “[t]he
agency…by which the demand for a multiplicity of decisions has been increased, [and which] has
in itself provided some remedy for the difficulties which have been created.” Turning from the
more critical positions of its earlier reports, the Committee then stated: “we [now] have uniform
systems of reporting and digesting common to all, and a basis, at least, of a common system which
shall be satisfactory to all.” As a result, there was no need for the bar or any official authority to
be directly involved in the digesting of decisions. Rather, “it is better [for lawyers] to avail
themselves of the labors of private publishers who make it their business to ascertain and satisfy
the needs of the profession.”132
The bar’s role, then, would be to advise the publishers on improving methods of making reports
and digests, encourage uniformity, and find ways to reduce the growth in published opinions.133
For the Committee, “the hope of uniformity lies in the two series of digests of the reports of the
whole country by which the bar of the whole country is now made acquainted with the decisions
of all the courts alike.”134 Striking a blow for practicality, the Committee argued that:
Whether these common plans are the best or not, it is by conforming to them, that we can
the most easily reach uniformity, and if there are improvements to be suggested they
should be directed towards the perfecting of these plans, and then we shall have a model
to which all the local digests may readily conform.135
The arrangement of the digest should be based not on “theoretical considerations,” but on “the
habits of thought and the actual wants of the men who are to use it,”136 a position completely
opposite to that expressed by Henry Terry in his 1888 letter to the ABA. For the Committee on
Law Reporting and Digesting, because “[t]he purpose of a digest is to enable us to find the law
contained in the reports … [i]t does not matter so much what plan of classification is adopted as
that we shall know clearly what the plan is, and that the same plan is always followed.”137 In 1900,
the Committee repeated its suggestion that “the system with which we are all equally familiar” be
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adopted in the states as the basis for “standard to which all the digests should substantially
conform.”138
The Special Committee on Classification of the Law languished for ten years after its 1891
response to Terry’s proposal.139 It became more active briefly after the 1901 appointment to the
committee of James DeWitt Andrews, who would be a prominent voice on questions of
classification of law within and outside the ABA for the next twenty years.140 In 1902, his
committee offered a fifty page report on “The Vocation of Legal Classification,” which Andrews
described as suggesting “the salient features and controlling points of what must ultimately
constitute the scheme of legal classification,” and proposed to submit a plan of classification to the
Association the following year.141 In 1903, however, he reported that the Committee had been
unable to meet and had no report to offer.142
No report was offered again in 1904, but Andrews offered an oral report in 1905. Noting the
Committee’s beginning as a response to Terry’s letter, he concluded that in sixteen years it had
accomplished little.143 Not only did the ABA not have the resources to carry out a classification
project, but neither the bar nor the teachers of law had shown active interest in legal classification:
I think it may be said that they do not fully perceive the intimate relations between
classification of law and the primary, paramount object of this Association, namely
the promotion of jurisprudence; … for until we have a systematic body of law
systematized we cannot have a jurisprudence.144
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Previewing the themes he would develop a few years later outside the ABA in the American
Corpus Juris project,145 Andrews showed little interest in the practical concerns that animated the
Committee on Law Reporting and Digesting. Rather, he argued that “classification is one of the
essentials, if not the essential element of a highly developed jurisprudence,” and proposed that the
matter of classification be referred to a joint committee of the Special Committee on Classification
and the standing Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform. His motion was adopted,146 but
apparently received with little enthusiasm by the Committee on Jurisprudence. In 1906, that
committee’s report said simply that because classification was a matter “peculiarly appropriate to
the Committee on Classification of the Law [it] will be reported by that committee.”147 The
Classification Committee itself had no report to offer.148 By 1908 it had disappeared from the list
of ABA Committees.149
The ABA discussions involving classification of the law indicate that, after rejecting Henry
Terry’s proposal for a single classification system to serve both the practical needs of the bar and
develop a scientific or philosophical structure for American law, the bar’s primary interest was in
the usefulness of classification systems to aid in the location of cases. The classification itself
need not be perfect as long as it worked. As put by Benjamin Tradwell, “a digest … is after all
only a labor-saving device.”150 The ABA’s favored approach to classification indicates that late
nineteenth century practitioners had little interest in digest classification systems or the principles
they embodied, other than as finding tools.
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C. West’s Perspectives on How to Use the Digests
In the early 1900s West Publishing Co. began to take an active role in educating law students
and practitioners about effective use of its publications.151 West representatives began to visit law
schools, and where allowed, offered lectures on topics of legal bibliography.152 What is probably
the first legal research and writing text, Brief Making and the Use of Law Books,153 edited by the
dean of the Stanford Law School, was issued in 1906. Around the same time, two long-running
West journals began publication. The American Law School Review (1902–1947) was published
as “An Intercollegiate Law Journal ” while West Publishing Company’s Docket (1909–1944) was
aimed at a broader professional audience.154
In 1903 and 1904 John Mallory published three articles in the American Law School Review
describing the features and importance of the classification system that he developed for West.155
Each article emphasized the importance of understanding the system in order to use the digests
effectively. In “The Use of Law Books,” Mallory pointed out that “[t]he great obstacle to a ready
and successful use of digests is lack of practical knowledge of their arrangement and structure….
[O]ne needs to know the titles or headings under which he should look, the scope of each as
compared with related topics, the methods of subdivision, the use of cross-references, etc…. Direct
and systematic instruction in this practical part of his work would greatly aid the student.”156 In
“Philosophical Classification of Law,” Mallory noted the importance of knowing “the terms in
common use as main headings of the law and their subdivisions, … the scope and contents of each
and the lines of discrimination between them as so used, and … the relations between their various
subjects.”157 This knowledge was now easier to obtain because of “[t]he gradual evolution of a
uniform classification founded on the principles set forth herein, for the American Digest and
General Digest systems, and the extensive adoption of that classification.”158 In the final article,
which described the classification systems of the American Digest and its predecessor the United
States Digest, Mallory pointed out that “knowledge of the principles applied in such a work is as
useful to the reader as to the compiler.”159
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Similarly, in 1903, Edward Q. Keasbey, the long-time chair of the ABA Committee on
Reporting and Digesting, published an American Law School Review article that praised the
American Digest classification and urged distribution of a West manual explaining the system for
use in law school instruction.160 In 1906, a tongue-in-cheek article published as “An Interview
with a Law Student” chastised lawyers who didn’t understand the classification system and law
schools for not instructing students in its use.161
In 1907, however, West representative Roger W. Cooley suggested a change in emphasis when
he described legal research less in terms of finding and applying principles than as a matter of
reducing the problem being researched to its lowest terms:
A general rule or principle of law ... implies nothing certain …. So a knowledge of the law
is to a great degree a knowledge of precedents .... [T]o find cases showing how the principles
have been applied [the lawyer] must use the facts as a guide, because the application arises
out of the act, and not vice versa.162
The following year, speaking on a panel with West and Andrews at the third annual meeting
of the American Association of Law Libraries, Cooley told his audience that, when a lawyer comes
to the law library, he should already have worked out the principle to be applied to his problem,
and “what he wants now is cases applying that principle to facts on all fours with, or similar to the
facts in his case.”163 To find those cases, Cooley suggested that the searcher remember that the
“cross reference heads and cross references in the digest form an index to the volume. Why not
use it as such?”164
In a 1909 article, Cooley again stressed the importance of relying on the facts of the case to
locate precedents.165 Describing the West’s program of legal research instruction in the law
schools (without mentioning West or his own affiliation with the company), Cooley noted that “for
obvious reasons” considerable time in those lectures was devoted to digests and other law-finding
tools. Yet:
Little or no attempt is made to teach the student any theory of classification of the law. …
In teaching the use of the digest for finding a first case—that is to say, for getting a start in
the search for authority—use is made of the descriptive word method. The practical
advantage of this method is that it does not presuppose any particular theory or system of
classification….166
With descriptive words from a statement of the facts for the case at issue, the researcher could
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of action, or remedy is to be found…. [I]f one case is found by use of a descriptive word, that case
may be used as a key to unlock the whole system of case law on that particular subject.”167
West’s approach to using the digest seemed to be moving away from Mallory’s emphasis on
knowledge of the principles of the classification system to use of the facts of the case at hand to
locate precedents more directly. Hicks wrote that, in developing their instructional program for
the law schools, Cooley and other West instructors “applied themselves to devising some easy
means of finding cases with the result that the ‘descriptive word’ method was formulated.”168 The
change in approach could be seen in the differences between the 1909 second edition of West’s
text: Brief Making and the Use of Law Books and the first, published in 1906.
In the first edition, the single chapter on “How to Find the Law” dealt exclusively with
classification. Having carefully developed a statement of facts for his case, lawyers should be able
to identify a general principle of law either from their own knowledge and experience, or from
“study of some logical standard of classification,” such as the American Digest system.169 Students
and lawyers “will find that a study of some standard system of classification, prepared upon logical
principles and adapted for practical use, will be of inestimable benefit….”170 The bulk of the
chapter consisted of a description of the American Digest System and definitions of its main heads
as a means of introducing classification to is intended audience of law students.
The second edition of Brief Making, edited by Cooley, devoted significantly more attention
than the first to researching the law. The chapter on digests noted that, although some lawyers
begin their research from a principle of law and others from the facts of their case, the searches
based on principles required conditions that “seldom co-exist: First, that the lawyer knows exactly
what principle governs his case; and, second, that he has such a thorough knowledge of the theory
of classification on which his digest is based that he can turn to the particular topic where that
principle is illustrated.”171 The chapter then described the difficulties of principle-based searching
compared to the relative ease of the descriptive word method which does not require the lawyer
“to know the theory or rules of classification” and ignores “all considerations of the science and
theory of digesting.”172 The chapter finished by outlining research using “the practical method”
of the descriptive word before turning to sections on the classification system.173
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In 1912 West introduced its first Descriptive Word Index as “an index or concordance of words
and terms …, which have been the subject of litigation.”174 The first advertisements for the new
single volume 2,000 page index noted that it consisted of “words and terms descriptive of the
persons, places and things, as well as of the crimes, torts, contracts and remedies which have been
the subject of litigation.”175 Although the classification system was described as “simplicity itself,”
the Descriptive Word Index would aid researchers “not familiar with its logical and scientific
arrangement,” who asked “How do I find the Key-Number for the proposition which I am
investigating.”176
In a short 1912 American Law School Review article called “The Descriptive Word,” R.A.
Daly, one of West’s law school instructors, wrote that the aim of legal research in any system “if
possible, is to find that case, or those cases, where, upon facts similar to the immediate question
involved, some court has applied the law.” For Daly: “The search for the law has become a search
for facts to which the legal principles have applied, rather than a search for the abstract principles
themselves.” 177
Almost apologetically, Daly ended his article noting that for each digest topic “there will be
found a long and more or less complicated analysis, requiring close examination to discover just
where the specific question could be properly placed.” If the right term were chosen in the index,
however, “the specific section or sections of the various topics can be found, and the attention at
once directed thereto, thereby saving much time and anxious thought.”178 In 1914, in a brief article
touting the need for practical training in legal research, Daly wrote that, in response to the problems
posed by the multiplicity of books, “law book publishers devised what have seemed to them helpful
methods of use by means of schemes of classification, mechanical and typographic devices, and
their combinations….”179 This was hardly a ringing endorsement, particularly in comparison to
the importance placed on the classification system in John Mallory’s articles only ten years earlier.
Over the next decade, Daly published several other articles on legal research. These short
pieces consisted mostly of research problems and answers, but occasionally they discussed the
context of research for cases. In 1915 Daly argued that the principles of law are “well known to
the profession” from law school; to apply principles in practice, however, “the court demands
precedents; that is to say, the court asks for cases decided in the past in which the facts were
essentially the same.”180 Precedents are found through analysis of the case at hand using the
descriptive word index.181 In 1920 he wrote that, finding principles was not the point of legal
research. Rather, “finding the law in active practice means the locating of that adjudicated case
174
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where some court, somewhere, at some time, applied the principle to facts on all fours with or
closely paralleling the facts of the case at bar.”182
The 3,070 page second edition of the Descriptive Word Index, which covered both the first and
the second decennial digests, was published in 1924. A single introductory page noted that the
index included “thousands of catchwords,” as well as the topic titles, Key-Number section lines
and editorial reference lines in the Decennials.” As a result, “it can be used as a complete index
to these books, without any reference whatever to the topical analysis in the various volumes.”183
It is not clear why West began to place less emphasis on the usefulness of the classification
system for research in the first decade of the twentieth century, nor why it regained prominence in
the 1914 and later editions of Brief Making, while articles in West journals continued to emphasize
the fact-based descriptive word approach. Yet, the specificity of the bulky descriptive word clearly
made it easier for lawyers to rely on factual research to find cases on point without seeing more of
the classification system than the key number for the subject they needed.

VI.

Reassessing the Influences of the Digest

Bob Berring’s arguments about the influences of legal information on lawyers’ thinking are
compelling and appealing to anyone interested in the history of legal information. In 2003, I
published an article, “Justice Jackson’s Lament: Historical and Comparative Perspectives on the
Availability of Legislative History,” with Berring’s ideas in mind.184 That article examined how,
after late nineteenth century changes in the systems for publishing and distributing federal
documents, the greater availability of legislative history information might have contributed to
federal courts’ increased use of legislative history. For me, it also demonstrated how hard it is to
show cause and effect relationships, or influences, in historical research.
From its introduction in 1887, West Publishing Company’s digest and classification system
clearly made it easier, and perhaps made it possible in light of the many published cases, for
American lawyers to locate precedents to argue their own cases. The classification system,
developed from the work of the Abbott brothers, who were renowned for their digesting skills, and
by John Mallory and others at West, was comprehensive, sensible, and built with the needs of the
practicing lawyer in mind. In the face of the fears of John Dillon and others that the common law
itself was threatened by the growing numbers of publication, it is also reasonable to think that, by
providing a superior tool to find cases, West’s digests helped allay those concerns.
The West digests functioned as what Allan Hanson called a “classified index.” The
classification system both organized information and provided access to it before there were
separate fact-specific descriptive word indexes to help lawyers access its contents. Prior to the
first Descriptive Word Index in 1912, lawyers presumably entered a West digest at a point
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determined by their general knowledge of the law, the classification system, or the specific area
they needed to research. In the process of seeking precedential cases in the digest, a lawyer had
the opportunity to learn more about the classification system and how the topic being researched
related to others. If so, the digest might have influenced their thinking about American law and
the common law system itself. Yet it is hard to know whether lawyers concentrating on locating
cases on specific points of law would take that opportunity, particularly if they found a “hog case”
relevant to their problem amidst the masses of cases in the digest.
After 1912, the specificity of the Descriptive Word Index would encourage the tendency to go
directly to a relevant key number for precedential cases. Barbara Bintliff eloquently described
how the research process might have proceeded, but how can we know how often busy twentiethcentury lawyers used the new more sophisticated indexes to do more than fine tune their searches
to find the cases they needed? We know what Peter Schanck thought about this, but we have no
research to tell us whether Bintliff or Schanck better describes how lawyers used print digests.
Beyond several early articles by John Mallory stressing the importance of understanding the
classification system, West’s own instructional publications tended to place greater emphasis on
searching for cases using the specific fact situations of a problem than on the classification system,
particularly after West established its law school instruction program and introduced the
descriptive-word indexes. Although the 1914 and later editions of Brief Making and the Use of
Law Books continued to describe the classification system, articles in West’s periodicals
emphasized fact-based research as the way to find precedential cases.
We know that at least some late nineteenth century American lawyers saw the benefits of better
classification as a means to keep the increasingly unwieldy body of the common law from breaking
down under the multiplicity of published cases. But those concerns were voiced at meetings of
the American Bar Association independently from concerns about the poor performance of
available digests in helping lawyers find the cases they need. After 1891, by employing separate
committees to deal with practical digest questions and classification, the ABA formally
distinguished efforts to improve legal classification from those intended to improve the digests.
ABA classification committee reports generally failed to mention digest classification systems,
despite the admiration shown for the Abbott brothers and the recognition provided to West’s digest
and classification system by other committees concentrating on reporting and digesting.
In 1902, the Special Committee on Classification’s lengthy report on the importance of legal
classification failed to note either the virtues or the shortcomings of the schemes devised by the
Abbotts and Mallory, which at least look like attempts to provide a scientific classification of
American law. Digests were not to be judged on the basis of their classification systems. As
Benjamin Tradwell told the West Virginia Bar Association, “a Digest which seeks to cultivate the
appreciation of a higher order of tool must necessarily fail to that extent as a labor-saving
device….” Furthermore, “one does not resort to the Digest to learn the general principles of law
and to observe their relation to each other.”185 If a digest did serve to remind lawyers of the
principles of law and their relationships, it had apparently failed in its primary task, helping them
get to the cases.
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Did the American Digest provide needed structure for the increasingly messy and bulky body
of published case law spewing forth from federal and state courts in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century? Of course it did. All one needs to do is look at the books, examine the Century
Edition and the first Decennial, to see the multiplicity of cases classified and organized under
West’s topical analysis. Yet, how the classification systems of the West digests might have
influenced the thinking of turn-of-the-century American lawyers and their successors about the
law remains a harder question to answer. What is clear is that, faced with the increasing bulk of
published case law, the American bar needed all the help it could get.
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